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S U M M A R Y
Depending on their destinations and activities, international travellers are at a significant risk of
contracting both communicable and non-communicable diseases. On return to their home countries,
such travellers may require intensive care. The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and more
recently Ebola haemorrhagic fever, has highlighted the risks. Other well-known communicable
pathogens such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and carbapenemase-producing Enter-
obacteriaceae have been described previously. However, malaria remains by far the most important
cause of death. The issues related to imported antibiotic resistance and protection from highly
contagious diseases are reviewed here. Surveillance strategies based on epidemiological data (country
visited, duration of travel, and time elapsed since return) and clinical syndromes, together with
systematic search policies, are usually mandatory to limit the risk of an outbreak. Single-bed hospital
rooms and isolation according to symptoms should be the rule while awaiting laboratory test results.
Because person-to-person contact is the main route of transmission, healthcare workers should
implement specific prevention strategies.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Imported antibiotic resistance
Infections caused by multidrug-resistant (MDR) pathogens are
typically associated with increases in morbidity, mortality, and
healthcare-associated costs, and represent an increasing public
health challenge of global dimensions.1 The combination of a
progressive loss of antibiotic efficacy due to the emergence and
dissemination of resistance and the slow rates of discovery andDOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2016.04.020
§ ESGCIP is the ESCMID Study Group for Infections in Critically Ill Patients;
ESGITM is the ESCMID Study Group for Infections in Travellers and Migrants.
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E-mail address: jrello@crips.es (J. Rello).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2016.04.019
1201-9712/ 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).development of new antibiotics active against MDR pathogens has
led to what has been termed the ‘antibiotic resistance crisis’. The
situation has been further complicated recently by the emergence
and dissemination of strains that remain susceptible to only a few
antibiotics (extensively drug-resistant (XDR) strains), which are
difficult to treat.2
The most challenging MDR pathogens include (1) methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), (2) vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (VRE), (3) Enterobacteriaceae producing extended-
spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBLs) or carbapenemases (CPE), (4)
XDR Pseudomonas aeruginosa that remain susceptible only to
polymyxins, and (5) carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter (CRA).
Among these, CPE and CRA are currently the most problematic due
to their XDR phenotypes, their propensity for epidemic diffusion inciety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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invasive infections.2
In principle, any of these pathogens can be encountered, either
as colonizers or as infecting agents, in travellers returning from
areas of endemicity and in patients repatriated from foreign
healthcare facilities. Acquisition may be the consequence of
exposure to contaminated food or environments, of close contact
with colonized individuals, or of admission to hospitals and
exposure to medical practices either for unexpected reasons (e.g.,
trauma, acute diseases) or for medical tourism (e.g., specialized
surgery, organ transplantation). As has been clearly documented,
the transmission of MRSA has increased with the growth of
international travel, resulting in either asymptomatic colonization
or clinically significant MRSA infections.3,4 Some evidence is also
available for the international dissemination of VRE via transfer/
repatriation of patients from hospitals located in endemic areas.5
Concerning Gram-negative organisms, the impact of international
travel has been firmly established in the dissemination of MDR
Enterobacteriaceae, including high-risk clones producing ESBLs
(especially enzymes of the CTX-M type) and/or carbapenemases of
various types (e.g., KPC, OXA-48, NDM, VIM).6–8 The risk of the
spread of MDR strains of Enterobacteriaceae in this situation
includes not only Escherichia coli, Klebsiella spp, and Enterobacter
spp, but also classical enterobacterial pathogens such as Salmonella
enterica and Shigella spp, with evidence of imported cases of
typhoid fever and shigellosis caused by MDR strains.8,9 The
transmission of MDR Acinetobacter has been documented follow-
ing the international transfer of patients from intensive care units
(ICUs) in countries with high-level endemicity,10 and the
repatriation of evacuees involved in military operations in endemic
areas.11 Less evidence is available for the travel-related dissemi-
nation of MDR/XDR P. aeruginosa strains, but this is clearly a
possibility following the transfer of colonized patients from ICUs
where these strains are endemic or are causing outbreaks.12
The admission to the ICU of patients colonized or infected by
MDR/XDR pathogens is a matter of concern, since it may be
followed by cross-infections and outbreaks in the ICU setting
unless suitable infection control practices are enforced immedi-
ately. Moreover, infections caused by MDR/XDR pathogens may
require different antimicrobial treatments from those routinely
used in the ICU, which are based on the local epidemiology; this
may result in inappropriate empiric treatment and thus increased
morbidity and mortality.
Therefore, the possibility of carriage or infection by an MDR/
XDR pathogen should always be considered for critically ill
returning travellers admitted to the ICU. A risk assessment should
be performed, considering the area of provenance, the history of
the patient, and the presence of additional risk factors for carriage
or infection by similar resistant pathogens.2,12
The epidemiology of MDR/XDR pathogens may vary according
to geographical area. The proportion of MRSA among S. aureus
isolates remains very high in some European countries, the USA,
Latin America, and the Far East, but is considerably lower in other
European countries such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries.13 ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae are now dissemi-
nated worldwide, with very high rates detected among ICU
patients in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle
East.14 For their part, CPE have achieved a notable level of
endemicity in some areas of Europe (e.g., Greece and Italy), the
Middle East (e.g., Turkey, Israel), South America (e.g., Colombia),
and China.15 Travellers/patients from areas of high endemicity for
MDR/XDR pathogens have a higher risk of exposure to these
pathogens, and the possibility of being infected or colonized by
these agents at the time of repatriation should always be
considered. When consulting sources of information regarding
resistance and endemicity (such as ProMED-mail, http://www.promedmail.org), clinicians should consider that (1) for several
countries (especially low-income settings) epidemiological infor-
mation is scarce or lacking, and (2) the epidemiology of MDR/XDR
pathogens can change rapidly. So this information should be
considered partial and should be updated regularly.
Exposure to medical practices in facilities from endemic areas,
either unanticipated or scheduled, is an additional risk factor for
carriage/infection by MDR/XDR pathogens.16
Recommendations for ICUs, based on the current evidence,
include the following:
(1) Carrying out a risk assessment for carriage/infection by MDR/
XDR pathogens for all ICU admissions of patients returning
from international travel or transferred from foreign hospitals.
(2) Enforcing infection control precautions upon admission for all
patients returning from international travel or transferred from
foreign hospitals with known risk factors for carriage/infection
by MDR/XDR pathogens. The infection control precautions
should cover the various types of MDR/XDR pathogens for
which a risk was assessed, and should be kept in place until
carriage/infection by MDR/XDR pathogens has been ruled out
by the proactive surveillance and clinical microbiology
diagnostic workup.
(3) Carrying out proactive surveillance for MDR/XDR pathogens for
which a risk was assessed by culture and/or molecular
methods.
2. Protection from highly contagious disease in critically ill
returning travellers in the ICU
2.1. Introduction to potentially life-threatening travel-associated
infectious diseases
Depending on their destinations and activities, international
travellers are at a significant risk of contracting both communica-
ble and non-communicable diseases.17 The emergence of severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV), Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and more recently
Ebola haemorrhagic fever, has highlighted the risks. However,
other well-known communicable pathogens such as MRSA18 and
CPE19,20 have been described previously. ICU patients, because of
the severity of illness, the workload, and the antibiotic selection
pressure, are important potential reservoirs of dangerous micro-
organisms. The most important challenges for ICU practitioners are
first to identify admissions with the highest risk of communicable
disease, and second to rapidly implement preventive measures in
order to avoid nosocomial transmission.
Surveillance strategies for the early detection of unusual
infectious disease events should be the rule. Syndromic surveil-
lance can help to reduce the identification time. All patients
transferred from hospitals in high-risk countries (Table 1) should
be considered as potential carriers of MDR or highly drug-resistant
microorganisms. All of these patients should be screened for rectal
carriage at admission and a few days after any antibiotic therapy.21
While awaiting screening results, the patient should be hospital-
ized in a single-bed room. Contact and body fluid precautions
should be added. All patients with fever and clinical or
radiographic evidence of pneumonia or acute respiratory distress
syndrome, and with a history of travel from countries in or near the
Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, the West Bank and
Gaza, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) within 14 days before
symptom onset, or close contact with a symptomatic traveller who
developed fever and acute respiratory illness within 14 days after
travelling from countries in the region, should be considered as
potentially infected by MERS-CoV.22 Viral haemorrhagic fever
Table 1
Distribution of the most common organisms by region and reservoir
Infectious agents Geographical origin Reservoir Main type of transmission Main type of protection
Viruses
MERS-CoV Middle East Dromedary camels Droplet contact Droplet precautions
SARS-CoV South China Chinese horseshoe bats Droplet contact, airborne Droplet precautions
H7N9 Eastern China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia Poultry, wild birds Droplet? Droplet precautions
Influenza virus Droplet Droplet precautions
Haemorrhagic fever Droplet, contact Droplet precautions




Southern Asia, India, Middle Eastern Countries;
Maghreb countries, Israel, Romania, Italy,
Turkey, Greece
Human Contact Contact precautions
XDR-TB and MDR-TB Russia, eastern Europe, southern Africa Human Airborne Airborne precautions
Meningococci Human Droplet Droplet precautions
MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus; XDR-TB, extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis;
MDR-TB, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis.
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Africa with fever and bleeding disorders, depending on the
geographical origin and local epidemiological situation. A general
syndromic approach to tropical infections in the ICU is described in
Table 2.23
Although many imported infectious diseases may require ICU
admission, the most frequent ones are relatively few in number. In
a descriptive analysis of acute and potentially life-threatening
tropical diseases among 82 825 ill Western travellers reported to
GeoSentinel from 1996 to 2011, 3655 patients (4.4%) with
13 diseases were identified; falciparum malaria (76.9%), enteric
fever (18.1%), and leptospirosis (2.4%) were the most frequent.
Ninety-one percent of patients had fever. The median time from
travel to presentation was 16 days. Thirteen (0.4%) patients died:
10 with falciparum malaria, two with melioidosis, and one with
severe dengue. Falciparum malaria was mainly acquired in West
Africa, enteric fever on the Indian subcontinent, and leptospirosis,
scrub typhus, and murine typhus in Southeast Asia.24
2.2. Transmission risks of highly contagious tropical infectious
diseases associated with healthcare settings
Emergency departments at general hospitals are the first units
to deal with an unknown highly contagious tropical infectiousTable 2
Syndromic approach to tropical infections in the ICU
Syndrome Diseases
Fever and toxic appearance
Fever and rash
Dengue fever, malaria, typho
haemorrhagic rash may indi
have been known to cause p
Crimean-Congo haemorrhag
Fever and thrombocytopenia Malaria, dengue, leptospiros
Fever with eosinophilia Schistosomiasis (Katayama f
migrans, tropical pulmonary
Severe pneumonia or ARDS Streptococcus pneumoniae, Le
Burkholderia pseudomallei (m
typhus, hantaviruses, corona
Pulmonary renal syndrome Falciparum malaria, leptospi
Hepatorenal dysfunction Falciparum malaria, leptospi
hepatorenal syndrome, yello
Acute abdomen Appendicitis, cholecystitis, d




enterohaemorrhagic E. coli (E
Altered sensorium Cerebral malaria, meningitis
virus, Murray Valley encepha
Eosinophilic meningoenceph
and schistosomiasis)
ICU, intensive care unit; VHF, viral haemorrhagic fever; ARDS, acute respiratory distresdisease and they should be prepared for this eventuality (a heavy
price was paid during the SARS outbreak). In an endemic area,
MERS-CoV infection is more likely to be acquired in healthcare
facilities than in the community: in the 2014 outbreak in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, more than four out of five exposures were at
healthcare facilities, mainly due to poor and insufficient isolation
measures at admission.25
Patients with suspected highly contagious tropical infectious
diseases should be placed directly in an emergency department
isolation room (if available) and should be examined and assessed
as soon as possible. Standard precautions and cough and
respiratory etiquette should be applied systematically. During
admission, these patients should avoid any contact with other
patients, and unprotected healthcare workers should avoid contact
with them. If possible, point-of-care bedside laboratory tests
should be used for sampling, or all analyses should be done in a
biosafety level 3/4 laboratory. Samples should be inactivated (with
formalin) before testing in a routine laboratory. Transfer to the ICU
or to a high-level isolation unit must be carried out in a secure
manner.
Many organisms are present in the ICU, but only a few are
involved in person-to-person transmission. An overview of the
precautions recommended for selected tropical infections and
conditions is shown in Table 3.id fever, early shigellosis, leptospirosis, and anicteric hepatitis. The presence of a
cate arboviral, rickettsial, and meningococcal aetiologies. Aetiologies of VHF that
erson-to-person transmission are Lassa virus, Ebola virus, Marburg virus, and
ic fever virus
is, rickettsiosis
ever or acute neurological sequelae of myelitis or encephalitis), visceral larva
 eosinophilia, acute fascioliasis, acute trichinosis
gionella pneumophila, bacterial sepsis with other pathogens, tuberculosis,
elioidosis), plague, histoplasmosis, malaria, typhoid fever, leptospirosis, scrub
viruses, highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1)
rosis, hantavirus infection, scrub typhus, severe pneumonia
rosis, scrub typhus, hepatitis E or A with fulminant hepatic failure and the
w fever virus
iverticulitis, perforated peptic ulcer, enteric fever, amoebic liver abscess
ica) and bacillary (Shigella spp, especially S. dysenteriae and S. flexneri,
hoidal Salmonella spp, Yersinia enterocolitica, enteroinvasive Escherichia coli, and
HEC))
, typhoid fever, viral encephalitis (Japanese encephalitis virus, Rift Valley fever
litis virus, West Nile virus, St. Louis encephalitis virus, rabies virus, Nipah virus).
alitis (Angiostrongylus cantonensis, Gnathostoma spinigerum, migrating ascarids,
s syndrome.
Table 3
Precautions recommended for selected tropical infections and conditions
Infection/condition Precautionsa Comments
Amoebiasis Standard Person-to-person transmission is rare (care when handling diapered infants
and mentally challenged persons)
Chagas disease (Trypansoma cruzi) Standard Not transmitted from person to person (only vertical transmission and organ/
blood donation)
Coronavirus: SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV Airborne
High-level
isolation unit




Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Install screens in windows and doors in endemic areas; use DEET-containing
mosquito repellents and clothing to cover extremities










Standard Not transmitted from person to person, except rarely by transfusion and for
West Nile virus by organ transplant, breast milk, or transplacentally
Install screens in windows and doors in endemic areas; use DEET-containing
mosquito repellents and clothing to cover extremities




Enteropathogenic O157:H7 and other shiga
toxin-producing strains
Salmonella species (including Salmonella Typhi)
Shigella species (bacillary dysentery)
Standard Use contact precautions for diapered or incontinent persons
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
Haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, and
other Puumala, Seoul, and Sin Nombre viruses
Droplet Rarely transmitted from person to person
Histoplasmosis Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Influenza, avian (H5N1, H7, H9 strains) Droplet
Leptospirosis Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Malaria Standard Not transmitted from person to person except through transfusion rarely and
through a failure to follow standard precautions during patient care
Install screens in windows and doors in endemic areas; use DEET-containing
mosquito repellents and clothing to cover extremities
Melioidosis Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Meningitis: meningococcal disease Droplet Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis for household contacts and healthcare
workers exposed to respiratory secretions
Eosinophilic meningitis (Angiostrongylus cantonensis, Gnathostoma spinigerum,
migrating ascarids, and schistosomiasis) is not transmitted from person to
person
Rabies Standard Person-to-person transmission is rare (has been reported in corneal, tissue, and
organ transplants). If the patient has bitten another individual or saliva has
contaminated an open wound or mucous membrane, wash the exposed area
thoroughly and administer post-exposure prophylaxis
Relapsing fever Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Rickettsial fevers, tick-borne (boutonneuse
fever, Rocky Mountain spotted fever,
tick-borne typhus fever, scrub typhus)
Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Schistosomiasis (bilharziasis) Standard Not transmitted from person to person




Rift Valley fever virus
Standard Not transmitted from person to person
Viral haemorrhagic fevers (2)
Kyasanur Forest disease virus
Omsk haemorrhagic fever virus




Junin virus (Argentine haemorrhagic fever)
Guanarito virus (Venezuelan haemorrhagic fever)
Machupo virus (Bolivian haemorrhagic fever)
Sabiá virus (Brazilian haemorrhagic fever)
High-level
isolation unit
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, Ebola virus, Marburg virus, Lassa
fever virus, Guanarito virus, and Machupo virus can be transmitted from person
to person. Unknown for Kyasanur Forest virus, Omsk virus, Junin virus, and
Sabiá virus
Emphasize: (1) use of sharp safety devices and safe work practices; (2) hand
hygiene; (3) barrier protection against blood and body fluids upon entry into
room (single gloves and fluid-resistant or impermeable gown, face/eye
protection with masks, goggles, or face shields); and (4) appropriate waste
handling. Use N95 or higher respirators when performing aerosol-generating
procedures. Largest viral load in final stages of illness when haemorrhage may
occur; additional PPE, including double gloves, leg and shoe coverings may be
used, especially in resource-limited settings where options for cleaning and
laundry are limited
SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; DEET, N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide; PPE, personal
protective equipment.
a Standard precautions include hand hygiene, use of PPE, prevention of needlestick injuries, environment cleaning, and the appropriate handling of waste. Droplet
precautions include standard precautions and the use of a single room, surgical masks for healthcare workers when working within 1–2 m of the patient, and a surgical mask
on the patient if transport is necessary. Airborne precautions include standard precautions and a single monitored negative-pressure room, closed door, special high-filtration
particulate respirators (N95 or FFP2 mask) for healthcare workers, and movement of the patient, wearing a surgical mask, only when essential.
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hospitalized patients with a suspected highly contagious tropical
infectious disease in the ICU
ICUs attend patients who are severely ill and in some way
immunocompromised because of underlying diseases and the use
of invasive medical devices and technology in their care.
Consequently, person-to-person transmission of pathogens may
be frequent. Intensive care therapy should be performed in
collaboration with the infectious disease team. The unit should be
subjected to negative pressure if available. The duration of manual
ventilation during resuscitation procedures should be kept to a
minimum. Non-invasive positive pressure ventilation should be
used instead of facial mask aerosol therapy when possible.
Endotracheal intubation and cardiopulmonary resuscitation have
been associated with increased SARS-CoV transmission among
physicians and nurses in the ICU. Endotracheal intubation should
be performed with rapid sequence induction by the most skilled
person available, who should wear personal protective equipment.
Meticulous infection control measures must be followed.
Invasive procedures should be avoided unless absolutely
essential. Chest radiography, ultrasonography, bronchoscopy, and
gastrointestinal endoscopy should be performed at the bedside,
avoiding moving the patient unnecessarily; if not possible, these
procedures should be performed in an air-controlled environment.
Patients who require dialysis at their bedside should receive either
peritoneal dialysis or haemodialysis, and dedicated haemodialysis
machines and decontaminated dialysate should be designated as
infectious waste.
Detailed tutorials and guidelines have been produced by the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),26 the European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),27 and the
European Network for Infectious Diseases (EUNID).28 There are
also other guidelines focused on specific diseases such as Ebola
virus disease (CDC) and Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever.29,30
New definitions of sepsis have different implications when
applied in low-income and middle-income countries,31 and a new
paradigm for management should be developed. A research agenda
highlighting the differences in approach between high-income and
poor-resource scenarios is required.
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